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IV. WHAT

I. INTRODUCTION
In most jurisdictions, convicted defendants have the right to an appeal at public expense, and to the assistance of counsel with that appeal. But the direct appeal is almost never concerned with actual
innocence. On direct appeal, courts will look at claims of trial error,
and evaluate those claims and their "harmlessness" based only on the
trial record. Thus, the chances of a reversal on direct appeal bear no
relation to the chances that the wrong person has been convicted.
While the current appeal system may encourage proper trial procedures,' it does not provide a check against wrongful conviction. The
disconnect between appeals and actual innocence is ironic, since most
jurisdictions provide funding for direct appeals, but not for collateral
attacks where claims of actual innocence can be litigated.2
Standards of review further obscure and avoid the question of actual innocence. Our current system of criminal appellate review is
geared to avoid factual issues. It is extremely difficult-if not impossible-to get an appellate court to take seriously a claim of factual error
such as the claim that a witness lied or was mistaken. Thus, a study of
200 persons exonerated through post-conviction DNA evidence
showed that few of those persons had raised claims on appeal related
* Associate Professor, University of Washington School of Law. I would like to
thank the symposium attendees as well as Mary D. Fan for their helpful comments.
1. Such encouragement is debatable, given the frequency with which harmless
error is invoked to eliminate any consequences from trial error. See note 33, infra.
2. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (holding indigent defendant entitled
to counsel on appeal). On collateral attack, where there is no right to counsel, convicted persons can introduce new evidence, which is usually necessary to prove innocence after conviction. See Keith A. Findley, Innocence Protection in the Appellate
Process, 93 MARO. L. REV. 591, 605 (2010) (discussing why new evidence can only be
introduced on collateral attack, but not on appeal).
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to their factual innocence, and very few of those claims met with success.3 Instead, the system seems to privilege procedural claims.'
Scholars and others have suggested reforms that might make the
appeal more meaningful to innocence.' This article will focus on just
one aspect of appellate review that could be made more likely to provide relief to the innocent through more reliable fact-finding: the
harmless error analysis. It is in assessing whether an error was harmless that the courts come closest to thinking about innocence on appeal.6 Although the focus of such inquiries was originally on whether
the error contributed to the verdict, in time courts have come to see it
more as whether the defendant is guilty: an evolution from what some
have called an "effect-on-the-verdict" to a "guilt-based" approach.'
Yet even in reviewing the evidence of guilt under various harmless
error standards, appellate courts do not adequately consider what we
have learned about evidence of guilt from DNA exonerations.
According to the Innocence Project, the leading cause of wrongful
convictions is eyewitness misidentification, followed by "unvalidated/
improper forensics," false confessions, and informants. 8 Current
harmless error standards run contrary to these findings, both in the
standard of harmlessness required for different errors and in the application of those standards. For example, most asserted errors implicating these likely causes of wrongful conviction will be evidentiary
errors subject to a looser review for harmlessness than constitutional
errors. And when courts review the record for "overwhelming" evidence of guilt under some harmless error standards, they often give
undue weight to unchallenged confessions, stranger eyewitness identifications, and dubious forensic evidence.
The first part of this essay examines the development of harmless
error law and its application to cases involving evidence of the type
implicated in wrongful convictions. The second part will look at how
harmless error analysis can be reinvigorated to take into account the
3. Brandon L. Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55 (2008).
4. Garrett, supra note 3, at 126 (citing William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship
between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1 (1997). Stuntz
argues that more procedural claims are raised because of "their greater likelihood of
success and ease of litigation .... "
5. See, e.g., Garrett, supra note 3, at 127 (discussing state "innocence commissions); Chad M. Oldfather, Appellate Courts, Historical Facts, and the Civil-Criminal
Distinction, 57 VAND. L. REV. 435 (2004) (discussing the expansion of factual review
on appeal). See Giovanna Shay, What We Can learn About Appeals From Mr. Tillman's Case: More Lessons From Another DNA Exoneration, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 1499,
1537 n.257 (2009) (discussing the movement away from a purely adversary system).
6. Garrett, supra note 3, at 107. Courts also come close to considering innocence
when they address an insufficient evidence claim-but such arguments rarely succeed.
Garrett, supra note 3, at 112.
7. Harry T. Edwards, To Err is Human, But Not Always Harmless: When Should
Legal Error Be Tolerated, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1167, 1171 (1995).
8. Innocence Project, http://www.innocenceproject.org/understand/ (last visited
Feb. 9, 2011).
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Innocence Project findings. This will require more than tinkering with
the standards; it may mean relying less on judicial speculation about
the effect of an error. Some inquiries might require remand hearings
where additional evidence can be admitted to determine the importance of an error to the verdict or the strength of the remaining untainted evidence.
Appellate courts are reluctant to find error prejudicial, and have
erected barriers to such findings. But since we provide direct appeals
at public expense, what better way to spend those resources than on
what should matter most: determining whether the right person has
been convicted? It is time for a better-informed harmless error standard that incorporates the lessons of the last three decades about the
realities of criminal justice.

1I.

HiSTORY OF HARMLESs ERROR

The idea of assessing errors for harmlessness on appeal has been
with us at least since the early 1900's when states began to adopt
harmless error rules in response to what was perceived as too many
reversals on technicalities.9 A federal statute that resembles the current Rule 52 (a) was enacted in 1919.10 Both provide that a judgment
shall not be reversed where an error does not "affect substantial
rights" of the parties. The original common law rule placed the burden on the beneficiary of the error (in criminal law, the prosecutor) to
prove that no harm resulted." The states did not always place the
burden on a particular party, and the Supreme Court, interpreting
Rule 52 in Kotteakos v. United States in 1946, held that any presumptions or burdens should arise "from the nature of the error and its
'natural effect' for or against prejudice in the particular setting." 1 2
Various formulations for harmlessness were advanced, including
whether the finding of guilt was nevertheless the "correct result," or
whether there was no "reasonable possibility" that the error contrib9. LaFave, et al., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (5th ed. 2009) § 27.6, p. 1320; Richard
A. Fairfax, Jr., A Fair Trial, Not a Perfect One: The Early Twentieth Century Campaign for the Harmless Error Rule, 93 MARQ. L. REV. 433, 436 (2010) (recounting
history of harmless error rules).
10. Id.; see also 28 U.S.C.A. § 2111 (West) (providing that "on the hearing of any
appeal or writ of certiorari in any case, the court shall give judgment after an examination of the record without regard to errors or defects which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties" and, which was originally enacted as Act of Feb. 26,
1919, ch. 48, 40 Stat. 1181, directing appellate courts to ignore "technical errors, defects, or exceptions which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties.") This
provision was originally enacted as, Act of Feb. 26, 1919, ch. 48, 40 Stat. 1181, directing appellate courts to ignore "technical errors, defects, or exceptions which do
not affect the substantial rights of the parties." FED. RULE CRIM. PROC. 52(a) provides: "Any error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial
rights shall be disregarded.".
11. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967).
12. Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 764 (1946).
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uted to the verdict.13 The Kotteakos Court set forth the standard for
federal harmless error as: "if, when all is said and done, the conviction is sure that the error did not influence the jury, or had but very
slight effect, the verdict and the judgment should stand. .. . But if one
cannot say, with fair assurance, after pondering all that happened
without stripping the erroneous action from the whole, that the judgment was not substantially swayed by the error, it is impossible to conclude that substantial rights were not affected."14 This standard has
been adopted in many state courts.
The federal constitutional harmless error doctrine began with Chapman v. California,16 in which the U. S. Supreme Court held that the
prosecutor's comments on the defendant's failure to testify (a Due
Process violation) could only be harmless if the reviewing court could
conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute
to the defendant's conviction." The burden was on the prosecution to
show harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt. Although Chapmanis
remembered primarily for rejecting automatic reversal for constitutional violations, Chapman was in fact a tougher standard for the
prosecution than the state court's rule that a violation was harmless if
it did not result in a "miscarriage of justice.""s At the time, every
state already had a harmless error doctrine,1 9 and Chapman announced a new, more rigorous standard for federal constitutional
violations.
However, the Chapman court maintained a distinction between
constitutional errors that were subject to harmless error analysis and
certain fair trial rights that were so basic that harm was presumed. In
the latter category were violations such as denial of counsel or judicial
bias, which violations could never be harmless.2 0 The Chapman court
also included coerced confessions in the latter category, but in 1991 in
Arizona v. Fulminante" the Court reversed itself and held that admission of an involuntary confession was subject to harmless error analysis. The Fulminante court found that the admission of a coerced
confession was not harmless in that particular case, but the Arizona
Supreme Court had found that it was harmless, that in fact the remaining evidence was "overwhelming." Most of the factors now identified as contributing to wrongful convictions would be classified by
the courts as trial errors, and therefore subject to harmless error
review.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

LaFave, et al., supra note 9, at 1322.
Kotteakos, 328 U.S. at 764-65.
LaFave, supra note 9, at 1322.
Chapman, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
Id. at 24.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 23 n.8. Edwards, supra note 7, at 1176.
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991).
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Even as the kind and number of errors subjected to harmless error
review has grown, the Court's standard for harmless constitutional error has moved back and forth between a focus on remaining evidence
of guilt and a focus on the likely effect of an error on the verdict. The
Chapman Court's analysis focused on the effect of the error itself: "it
is completely impossible for us to say that the State has demonstrated,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that the prosecutor's comments and the
trial judge's instruction did not contribute to petitioners' convictions." 22 The Fulminante Court held that the appellate court should
''simply review the remainder of the evidence against the defendant to
determine whether the admission of the confession was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."2 3 The Fulminante formulation of the
harmless error test focuses on the "remainder of the evidence against
the defendant," and can easily lead to the "guilt-based" approach that
Judge Edwards has warned against.2 4 Since then, the Court itself has
at times emphasized the evidence of guilt and at other times emphasized the error's effect upon the verdict.2 5
The vast majority of criminal convictions are obtained in state
courts and reviewed by state courts. These courts are bound by the
United States Supreme Court harmless error precedent when evaluating federal constitutional claims, but their application of these precedents is not likely to be reviewed, let alone reversed, by another
court. 2 6 Non-constitutional harmless error is assessed under state
rules, which are often less stringent than the federal rule, at least in
how they are expressed. 27 Most harmless error review-constitutional
or non-constitutional-is cursory,28 with little explanation.29
22. Chapman, 386 U.S. at 26.

23. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991).
24. Edwards, supra note 7, at 1171.
25. LaFave at 1330; See Brent M. Craig, 'What Were TheyThinking?' A Proposed
Approach to Harmless Error Analysis, 2006 FLA. COASTAL L. REV. 1, 6-12 (2006)
(discussing Court's vacillation between a focus on the "overwhelming evidence" and
whether the error "contributed to the verdict.").
26. A state court's factual misapplication of settled harmless error law is not likely
to gain the attention of a higher court for discretionary review, and it will certainly
not meet the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act's requirements for
habeas relief in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
27. For example, in California the non-constitutional harmless error standard is
whether there has been a "miscarriage of justice," defined as when "after an examination of the entire cause, including the evidence," the court finds "that is it reasonably
probable that a result favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in
the absence of the error." People v. Watson, 46 Cal. 2d 818, 836 (1965), discussed in
Meehan Rasch, California's Dueling Harmless Error Standards: Approaches to Federal ConstitutionalErrorin Civil Proceedings and Establishinghe Proper Test for Dependency, 35 W. ST. U. L. REV. 433, 441 (2008).
28. Brandon L. Garrett, Innocence, Harmless Error,and Federal Wrongful Con-

viction Law, 2005 Wis. L.

REV.

35, 60 (2005).

29. See, e.g., Garrett,supra note 3, at 107-09 (discussing opinions of DNA exonneree cases).
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Harmless error type analysis also is embedded in other aspects of
appellate review, such as the federal "plain error" rule,3 0 ineffective
assistance of counsel claims," and prosecutorial withholding of exculpatory evidence claims.3 2 In these instances, where "prejudice" or
"materiality" is made part of the claim itself, the burden to show a
lack of harmlessness falls on the defendant. Thus, appellate review is
permeated with assessments of the entirety of the evidence and the
defendant's likely guilt. Yet, this ostensible concern with the question
of guilt is not rationally tied to the reliability of convictions. The rigor
of the various tests is determined not by how likely the error is to have
contributed to an unreliable verdict, but by the constitutional severity
of the error. And in reviewing the trial record, courts rely on discredited presumptions about evidence and juries. Actual innocence seems
to the courts to be extremely unlikely and therefore irrelevant.
Thus, we have an appellate system that discourages factual claims,
yet rejects procedural claims based on unreliable appellate factual
evaluations of the record. Before the wave of DNA exonerations,
however, the primary critique of harmless error analysis was not that
it maintained wrongful convictions, but that it rendered procedural
Even the critics of excessive harmless error
rights meaningless.
seemed to assume the guilt of the convicted. With the number of
DNA exxonerees at 272,34 it is no longer possible to ignore the possibility of wrongful convictions, especially in certain kinds of cases.

III. HARMLESS ERROR

AND THE LIKELY CAUSES OF
WRONGFUL CONVICTION

The major contributors to wrongful conviction are eyewitness misidentification, followed by "unvalidated/improper forensics," false
confessions, and informants. It is difficult to challenge these kinds of
errors as constitutional violations." The ostensible rigor of the harmless error standard applied to claims related to these factors depends
on whether it is a constitutional claim or merely a state evidentiary
claim. However, there is significant confusion of standards, not only
in the Supreme Court, but also in the federal and state appellate
30. See, e.g., United States v. Marcus, 130 S. Ct. 2159 (2010) (discussing defendant's obligation under plain error rule, FED. R. CRIM. PROC. 52, to show, among
other things, that unpreserved error was not harmless).
31. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (requiring, as part of an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, that defendant show a "reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different.").
32. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (requiring a showing that improperly
withheld evidence was material). The materiality aspect of a Brady claim is essentially
a harmless error analysis.
33. See, e.g., Edwards, supra note 7, at 1197-99; Roger J. Traynor, THE RIDDLE OF
HARMLESs ERROR (1970).
34. http://www.innocenceproject.org/know/ (last visited Jul. 25, 2011).
35. Garrett, supra note 3, at 76-77, n.80.
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courts. 36 In practice, observers see little difference in the standards as
applied.37
Eyewitness misidentification: A defendant might challenge an eyewitness identification on federal constitutional grounds by claiming
the police obtained the identification using impermissibly suggestive
methods. Such a claim is based on the Due Process clause,3 8 and is
difficult to win.3 9 However, the state usually will not need to prove
that an unduly suggestive identification was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, because the Court has held that no violation occurs
where an unduly suggestive identification is "otherwise reliable,"40 a
kind of preliminary harmless error test built into the assessment of the
claim. The Court has given several factors for assessing reliability, including the witnesses' opportunity to view the suspect, the witnesses'
level of certainty, and the time elapsed between the observation and
the eyewitness identification procedure." Scientific research has discredited this list, especially the "degree of certainty," and DNA exonerations have shown just how unrelated to reliability they are-or at
least how loosely they are applied to uphold convictions.4 2 Thus the
reliability standard for claims related to erroneous eyewitness identification is itself unreliable and unlikely to assist in uncovering wrongful
convictions. Several scholars have written extensively on this phenomenon.4 3 Of the wrongfully convicted persons in Garrett's study
who challenged the eyewitness identifications, none prevailed in appellate courts on this claim.4 4
Even if an appellate court does find an identification unduly suggestive and unreliable, it will then review the remaining evidence for
harmlessness. Here, courts often fail to consider the corrupting effect
of a suggestive identification on the remaining evidence, including
subsequent identifications, and even confessions: the erroneous identi36. See Michael H. Graham, Abuse of Discretion, Reversible Error,Harmless Error, Plain Error,Structural Error; a New Paradigm for Criminal Cases, 43 CRIM. L.
BULL. 6 (2007); Meehan Rasch, California's Dueling Harmless Error Standards: Approaches to Federal Constitutional Error in Civil Proceedings and Establishing he
Proper Test for Dependency, 35 W. ST. U. LAw REV. 433,437 (2008)(discussing confusion in harmless error standards).
37. Edwards, supra note 7, at 1179.
38. See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 99 (1977).
39. In Garrett's study of 200 exonerees, 28 % of those with written appellate decisions raised suggestive identification procedure claims-none of the claims prevailed.
Garrett, supra note 3, at 80. Yet 78% of the exonerees were convicted at least in part
by mistaken eyewitness identification. Garrett, supra note 3, at 76.
40. Manson, 432 U.S. at 106.
41. Id. at 114.
42. See Nancy K. Steblay, Maintainingthe Reliability of Eyewitness Evidence: After the Lineup, 42 CREIGHTON L. REV. 643 (2009) (discussing scientific research on
lineup identifications); See Garrett, supra note 3, at 81, n.93 (citing assessments of
scientific studies of eyewitness identification).
43. Garrett, supra note 28, at 79; See, e.g., Steblay, supra note 42.
44. See supra, note 39.
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fication may lead to the false confession. 4 5 The identification, especially if it occurred early in the investigation, cannot be easily excised
from the rest of the case. But the harmless error standard does not
encourage courts to look back, behind the trial, to how the investigation unfolded.
False Confessions: False confessions are more common than generally believed. 46 A false confession may be made because of unconstitutional coercion or a Miranda violation, in which case the defendant
may raise a constitutional claim subject to a constitutional harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt standard. 47 However, a false confession
may also be given for reasons other than improper police behavior, in
which case an appellate challenge would have to be based on other
evidentiary grounds, if it could be challenged at all.48
Here, courts often fail to consider the devastating effect of a confession upon the jury and the relationship between the confession and
the development of additional evidence. For example, as in Fulminante, one confession may lead to a repetition, or a jailhouse informant's claim that it was repeated. While the Court in Fulminante held
that the admission of the coerced confession was not harmless, the
state court had held that the remaining evidence was "overwhelming."
Before DNA exonerations in significant numbers, it may have been as
difficult for reviewing judges to disregard confessions as it was for juries.4 9 And researchers have documented the corrupting effect that a
confession can have on identification procedures and on eyewitnesses
asked to make identifications.5 0
Courts have lost the suspicion of confessions that gave rise to the
corpus delicti rule5 1-but perhaps we need to bring it back. Since
45. Studies show that the reverse also can occur-knowledge of a confession can
lead to an erroneous eyewitness identification. Steblay, supra note 42, at 652.
46. Alan Hirsch, Confessions and Harmless Error: A New Argument for the Old
Approach, 12 BERKLEY J. CRIM. LAw 1, 4 (2007).
47. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 295-302 (1991) (finding that the defendant's confession was coerced and admitting his confession into evidence was not
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).
48. In the Garrett study, only 50% of those who falsely confessed challenged the
confession on appeal on federal grounds, and an additional 15% raised state law
claims or indirect constitutional claims. Only one prevailed, and that was through an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Garrett, supra note 3, at 90.
49. Concurring in Fuliminante, Justice Kennedy noted the "indelible impact a full
confession may have on the trier of fact." Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 313. Appellate
judges are also affected by confessions. See Hirsch, supra note 46, at 16.
50. See Lisa E. Hasel & Saul M. Kassin, On the Presumption of Evidentiary Independence: Can Confessions CorruptEyewitness Identifications?, 20 PsycHoL. Sci. 122
(2009) reported in Steblay, supra note 42, at 651-52 ("sixty-one percent of eyewitnesses who had made an identification of a lineup member two days earlier changed
their earlier identification in accordance with the 'confession' of the other lineup
member," and "[f]ifty percent of those eyewitnesses who had not made an identification at the first session now changed their prior non-identification decision to identification of the 'confessor'").
51. See Wayne R. LaFave, CRIMINAL LAw (5th ed. 2010) § 1.4(b) at 2-23.
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Fulminante,courts have become very comfortable with finding the admission of coerced confessions harmless, often with little analysis, and
sometimes on the basis of repetitions of the confession.5 2
Unvalidated/improperforensics: Forensic evidence can contribute to
wrongful conviction when it is improperly or badly done, or when it is
based on bad science. Some forensic methods have been discredited
in recent years: e.g., bite mark identification, blood serology, hair and
fiber analysis.54 Appellate challenges to the admission of forensic evidence will be reviewed under non-constitutional harmless error standards, unless the defendant can make out a due process violation, a
very difficult task." Challenges to forensic evidence will most likely
be on evidentiary grounds, and such claims are subject to a deferential
standard of review and harmless error standard.
More importantly, it is difficult to mount a challenge to forensic
evidence on appeal if such a challenge was not made at trial. Such a
challenge usually requires a forensic expert, which may not be available to indigent defendants. 6
Informants/snitches:Challenges to lying informant evidence are difficult to bring, since the credibility of witnesses is generally not assailable on appeal. Informant testimony can be indirectly attacked
through a Brady challenge if the defendant can show that the prosecution withheld impeachment evidence, such as a compensation agreement.57 Here, the defendant will first have to overcome a harmless
error type hurdle in showing that the impeachment evidence was "material," meaning there is a "reasonable probability that, had the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding
would have been different. A "reasonable probability" is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."5
Brady challenges or challenges based on newly discovered impeachment evidence or recantations will most likely have to be brought in a
collateral attack rather than on appeal, since these kinds of challenges
52. Hirsch, supra note 46, at 13-22 (discussing examples). Of the 16 who raised
the claim of coerced confession in Garrett's study, none prevailed. Garrett, supra
note 3, at 96.
53. Garrett, supra note 3, at 81-85.
54. Hirch, supra note 46, at 13-22. See also Committee on Identifying the Needs
of the Forensic Sciences Community, National Research Council, Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path Forward 127-93 (2009) (critiquing many of
the forensic identification methods used in criminal prosecutions).
55. Forensic evidence might be so improper or misleading as to violate fundamental fairness. See State v. Ortiz, 831 P.2d 1060, 1082 (Wash. 1992) (Smith, J., dissenting)
(finding a due process violation where tracker testified that he could read nationality
and other characteristics from footprints). See Garret,supra note 3, at 85, n.1 12 (citing
Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1, 7 (1967) (noting that forensic evidence will also violate Due
Process if the defendant can show it was fabricated)).
56. Garrett, supra note 3, at 85.
57. See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676-77 (1985) (holding Brady applies to withheld impeachment evidence).
58. Id. at 682.
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generally involve evidence outside the trial record. 5 9 On direct appeal, an informant's testimony can only be challenged through issues
such as those involving the scope of cross-examination allowed, or the
admissibility of impeachment evidence. Such errors, difficult to show
under the differential standard of review for evidentiary claims, would
be subject to the evidentiary harmless error test. In Garret's study, of
the 12 exonerees who challenged informant testimony on appeal, only
one prevailed.6 0
Presumptions about evidence in any harmless error review. The
above discussion shows how the kinds of errors that can contribute to
wrongful conviction may be perpetuated through deferential harmless
error analysis. In addition, presumptions about the relative strength
of certain kinds of evidence, and a lack of appreciation for how evidence can be interrelated, can also prevent innocent persons from prevailing on appeal on any issue subject to harmless error analysis.
Regardless of the issue, if the court finds non-structural error, it will
review the remaining evidence as part of a harmless error analysis. In
doing so, the court may rely heavily on a confession-even when the
defendant attacked it at trial-or on stranger cross-racial eyewitness
identifications, or on questionable forensic evidence. The court may
find that the cumulative effect of such evidence is "overwhelming,"
ignoring the fact that such evidence is interrelated and likely tainted
by the error.6 1 Courts may conflate the Jackson v. Virginia6 2 standard
for sufficiency of the evidence ("whether, after viewing the evidence
in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt" 6 3 ) with the harmless error standard, which requires no such
deference to the state's evidence.
IV.

WHAT

Is To

BE DONE?

In light of the rapid expansion of harmless error findings, and the
confusion of standards, it seems futile to propose more stringent
word-formulae for harmless error review. What is needed is an
awareness of the real possibility of innocence, and respect for the right
to jury trial. Courts look at one or both of two aspects of the case
when assessing harmlessness. First, courts may focus on the remaining
evidence introduced against the defendant and second, courts may focus on the error itself and its likely impact on the verdict. Both approaches rely on appellate imagination. One approach involves an
59. If the challenge is brought in a post-trial motion shortly after conviction, it
may be consolidated with the trial appeal. Otherwise, such a challenge will come later
in a collateral attack.
60. Garrett, supra note 3, at 77, 86-87.
61. Garrett, supra note 3, at 108-09.
62. Jackson v. Virginia., 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
63. Id. at 319.
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imaginary trial where there was no error, the other imagines the trial
that actually occurred. The following proposed guidelines will help
courts to recognize the possibility of innocence under either approach.
The remaining evidence. Under any standard of harmlessness,
whether "beyond a reasonable doubt" or "more likely than not,"
courts should review the remaining evidence with the following
cautions:
(1) Stranger identification should be viewed as weak, and insufficient to support a finding of harmlessness.
(2) A confession should be viewed as no more weighty than any
other witness testimony.
(3) Where there is forensic evidence of the type that has been discredited (hair and fiber, for example) the court should be reluctant to find harmlessness.
(4) Informant testimony, like confessions or stranger identification,
should not be presumed reliable.
The error'seffect on the verdict. In reviewing the likely effect of an
error on the verdict, courts should consider:
(1) The overwhelming impact of a confession on the jury
(2) The persuasive effect of eyewitness certainty, and its inverse relation to reliability
(3) The persuasive effect of scientific testimony on lay jurors
Courts may resist the first set of proposals because they can be seen
as casting doubt on evidence in the case even when that evidence has
not been challenged. One could argue that if the evidence was not
challenged before the jury, it should not be viewed suspiciously on
appeal. Given the system-wide emphasis on preservation and waiver
of issues, a reluctance to question the unchallenged evidence makes
sense. But if we want innocence to be relevant-even an important
value-on appeal, it makes more sense to invigorate harmless error
review with an awareness of the contributors to wrongful conviction.
Another related objection to these proposals is that it keeps appellate courts in the business of speculating about guilt and innocence,
advocating a set of presumptions in favor of possible innocence, and
pushing courts further into the much-criticized "guilt-based" approach
to harmless error. True, the above proposals urge the court to be cautious about finding harmlessness for reasons that the jury may never
have considered. In that sense, the appellate court would not be considering how the verdict and this particular trial may have been affected. Again, the response can only be that appellate courts should
make some effort to guard against conviction of the innocent. The
possibility of innocence is a good reason to allow a retrial or other
remedy when the court has already determined that error occurred.
Related to these objections is a more fundamental question about
whether criminal appeals should be concerned with procedural justice
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(fair procedures) or a just result (the right person is convicted). Historically, liberals and those representing criminal defendants have
been on the side of procedural justice while conservatives were less
concerned with procedural niceties where guilt was likely. Both sides
of this debate seemed to assume that most of those convicted were in
fact guilty. In some senses, DNA exonerations have flipped these positions, so that the above proposals suggest that some procedural rules
should be overlooked where innocence is likely.
One of the attractions of harmless error is that it avoids expensive
retrials of people who are probably guilty. For this reason, it may be
time to consider compromise alternatives such as remand hearings to
consider the effect of an error and the strength of the remaining evidence. Such a hearing might be warranted where the remaining evidence seems strong but includes evidence of the kind implicated in
wrongful convictions or where the effect of erroneously admitted evidence of that type is at issue. At such hearings, counsel should be
permitted to attack evidence as unreliable and unlikely to have supported the verdict. Counsel should also be able to support a claim
that erroneously admitted evidence had a determinative effect on the
verdict.
One interesting proposal to sharpen harmless error review is to
have jurors fill out post-verdict forms on the importance of certain
evidence or an instruction that was challenged at trial.6 4 One can imagine all kinds of problems and limitations to such a proposal, but it
might be helpful in taking some of the imaginative aspects out of
harmless error review occurring months, even years, after the verdict.
Harmless error is just one aspect of post-conviction review, and reform of harmless error alone will not prevent wrongful convictions
from being affirmed. Rules of preservation and waiver of issues, as
well as the difficulty of raising factual challenges on appeal, are also
barriers to litigating innocence on appeal. There is also a relationship
between the standard for showing error, and the ease with which
courts can find error harmless-there is reason to believe that if harmless error becomes more difficult to find, courts will be reluctant to
find error in the first instance. After all, harmless error developed
almost hand in hand with criminal procedural rights.
Nevertheless, because harmless error analysis is where appellate
courts assess the evidence against a defendant, and because it has become such an important part of any appeal, harmless error analysis
should be reformed to take into account what we now know about
contributors to wrongful conviction. Appeals are provided at public
expense to indigent defendants. It is time to make innocence at least
partly relevant to appellate decisions.
64. Craig, supra, note 25, at 16-23 (proposing that a hybrid between a jury poll
and a special verdict form should be used to establish a record to assist the appellate
courts in harmless error analysis).
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